| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9065 |
| DP9065 Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-07-22 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Incomplete contracts Investment incentives Public goods |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9065 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537899 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP9065 Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information. 2012. |
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