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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP9079 |
DP9079 Advertising and the Distribution of Content | |
Helen Weeds | |
发表日期 | 2012-08-05 |
出版年 | 2012 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper examines incentives for exclusive distribution of content in the presence of advertising. A monopoly seller of content - such as televisation rights to popular sports - may contract with one or both of two competing distributors, charging lump-sum fees. When distributors are subscription-funded, exclusive sale to a single buyer is the seller's profit-maximising choice, even when distributors also sell advertising airtime. When distributors are purely advertising-funded, however, non-exclusive contracting may instead be preferred. Advertising revenues accruing directly to the content provider may also generate a preference for non-exclusivity even when selling to subscription-funded distributors. The analysis has implications for the distribution of content to pay TV and free-to-air broadcasters, and for internet distribution of content. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Advertising Broadcasting Exclusivity Internet |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9079 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537912 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helen Weeds. DP9079 Advertising and the Distribution of Content. 2012. |
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