G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9079
DP9079 Advertising and the Distribution of Content
Helen Weeds
发表日期2012-08-05
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要This paper examines incentives for exclusive distribution of content in the presence of advertising. A monopoly seller of content - such as televisation rights to popular sports - may contract with one or both of two competing distributors, charging lump-sum fees. When distributors are subscription-funded, exclusive sale to a single buyer is the seller's profit-maximising choice, even when distributors also sell advertising airtime. When distributors are purely advertising-funded, however, non-exclusive contracting may instead be preferred. Advertising revenues accruing directly to the content provider may also generate a preference for non-exclusivity even when selling to subscription-funded distributors. The analysis has implications for the distribution of content to pay TV and free-to-air broadcasters, and for internet distribution of content.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Advertising Broadcasting Exclusivity Internet
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9079
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537912
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Helen Weeds. DP9079 Advertising and the Distribution of Content. 2012.
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