全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP9098 The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP9098
	DP9098 The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting
	Jean-Robert Tyran; Rebecca Morton; Marco Piovesan
发表日期	2012-08-26
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a ?dark side?, i.e. result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. We develop a model to predict how two types of social information shape efficiency in the presence of biased voters and we test these predictions using a novel experimental design. In line with predictions, we find that information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. In the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective. While voters with higher cognitive abilities are more likely to be de-biased by such information, most voters do not seem to interpret such information rationally.
主题	Public Economics
关键词	Biased voters Information aggregation Majority voting
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp9098
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537931
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jean-Robert Tyran,Rebecca Morton,Marco Piovesan. DP9098 The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting. 2012.