| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9099 |
| DP9099 Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice | |
| Jean-Robert Tyran; Ernesto Reuben | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-08-26 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Public goods competition tournament cooperation voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9099 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537932 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean-Robert Tyran,Ernesto Reuben. DP9099 Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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