| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9084 |
| DP9084 Loan Sales and Screening Incentives | |
| Thomas Gehrig; Helmut Bester | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-09-16 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the effect of loan sales on the intensity of costly screening. Loan sales strengthen screening incentives when screening primarily improves the bank?s ability to identify profitable loans and when banks retain most of those profitable loans. However, loan sales dampen screening incentives when the benefit of screening primarily helps to weed out unprofitable projects. Moreover, alternative institutions of information production and the institutional market framework affect the relative benefits and costs of loan sales, and screening respectively. Accordingly, the potential regulation of loan sales has to take into account the whole impact on societal information production, both in markets and non-market institutions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Loan sales Screening Securitization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9084 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537962 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Gehrig,Helmut Bester. DP9084 Loan Sales and Screening Incentives. 2012. |
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