G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9084
DP9084 Loan Sales and Screening Incentives
Thomas Gehrig; Helmut Bester
发表日期2012-09-16
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要We analyze the effect of loan sales on the intensity of costly screening. Loan sales strengthen screening incentives when screening primarily improves the bank?s ability to identify profitable loans and when banks retain most of those profitable loans. However, loan sales dampen screening incentives when the benefit of screening primarily helps to weed out unprofitable projects. Moreover, alternative institutions of information production and the institutional market framework affect the relative benefits and costs of loan sales, and screening respectively. Accordingly, the potential regulation of loan sales has to take into account the whole impact on societal information production, both in markets and non-market institutions.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Loan sales Screening Securitization
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9084
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537962
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Thomas Gehrig,Helmut Bester. DP9084 Loan Sales and Screening Incentives. 2012.
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