| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9135 |
| DP9135 The Customs Union issue:Why do we observe so few of them? | |
| Gerald Willmann; Giovanni Facchini; Peri Silva | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-09-16 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades, yet most existing arrangements take the form of free trade areas, and less than ten percent can be considered to be fully fledged customs unions. This paper develops a political economy model of trade policy under imperfect competition to provide a positive explanation for the prevalence of free trade areas. In a three--country setting, a representative from each prospective member is elected to determine the tariffs to be applied on imported goods. Under a customs union, the necessity to coordinate tariffs leads voters to strategically delegate power to more protectionist representatives. We show that strategic delegation may imply that free trade areas increase the prospective member countries' welfare compared to customs unions. Moreover, the model also indicates conditions under which free trade areas are more likely to be politically viable than customs unions. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Preferential trade agreements Strategic delegation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9135 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537969 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerald Willmann,Giovanni Facchini,Peri Silva. DP9135 The Customs Union issue:Why do we observe so few of them?. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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