| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9141 |
| DP9141 Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. In an incomplete contracting framework, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We show that this conclusion relies on their assumption that the parties split the renegotiation surplus 50:50. If the generalized Nash bargaining solution is applied, then for any pair of valuations that the two parties may have, there exist bargaining powers such that either ownership by the government or by the NGO can be optimal. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Investment incentives Ownership Public goods |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9141 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537976 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP9141 Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods. 2012. |
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