| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9147 |
| DP9147 Agency, Firm Growth and Managerial Turnover | |
| Ronald Anderson; Maria Cecilia Bustamante | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard in a firm subject to stochastic growth opportunities. In our model, managers are dismissed after poor performance, but also when an alternative manager is more capable of growing the firm. The optimal contract may involve managerial entrenchment, such that growth opportunities are foregone after good performance. Firms with better growth prospects have higher managerial turnover and more front-loaded compensation. Firms may pay severance to incentivize their managers to report truthfully the arrival of growth opportunities. By ignoring the externality of the dismissal policy onto future managers, the optimal contract implies excessive retention. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Agency Compensation policy Firm growth Managerial turnover Optimal contracting Severance pay |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9147 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537982 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ronald Anderson,Maria Cecilia Bustamante. DP9147 Agency, Firm Growth and Managerial Turnover. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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