| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9164 |
| DP9164 Exclusionary Pricing in a Two-Sided Market | |
| Massimo Motta; Helder Vasconcelos | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-10-07 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we provide a new way of modelling two-sided markets, and we then use this model to study anti-competitive conduct in an asymmetric two-sided market which captures the main features of some recent antitrust cases. We show that below-cost pricing on one market side can allow an incumbent firm to exclude a more efficient rival which does not have a customer base yet. This exclusionary behaviour is the more likely to occur the more mature the market and the stronger the established customer base of the incumbent. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Demand externalities Predation Two-sided markets |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9164 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537999 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Motta,Helder Vasconcelos. DP9164 Exclusionary Pricing in a Two-Sided Market. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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