G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9165
DP9165 Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance
Maitreesh Ghatak; Thiemo Fetzer; Jonathan de Quidt
发表日期2012-10-07
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare, while despite possible information frictions competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-profit lending. In addition, for-profit lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non-profits.
主题Development Economics ; Financial Economics ; Public Economics
关键词For-profit market power Microfinance Social capital
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9165
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538000
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Maitreesh Ghatak,Thiemo Fetzer,Jonathan de Quidt. DP9165 Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance. 2012.
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