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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP9165 |
DP9165 Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance | |
Maitreesh Ghatak; Thiemo Fetzer; Jonathan de Quidt | |
发表日期 | 2012-10-07 |
出版年 | 2012 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare, while despite possible information frictions competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-profit lending. In addition, for-profit lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non-profits. |
主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
关键词 | For-profit market power Microfinance Social capital |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9165 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538000 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maitreesh Ghatak,Thiemo Fetzer,Jonathan de Quidt. DP9165 Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance. 2012. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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