| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9182 |
| DP9182 The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options | |
| Nicolas Sahuguet; Pierre Chaigneau | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-10-21 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting in which firms compete for CEOs. The optimal contracts are designed to retain and insure CEOs. The retention motive explains pay-for-luck in executive compensation, while the insurance feature explains asymmetric pay-for-luck. We show that the optimal contract can be implemented with stock-options based on a single performance measure which does not filter out luck. When the capacity to dismiss underperforming CEOs differs across firms, and the ability of different CEOs is more or less precisely estimated ex-ante, endogenous matching between CEOs and firms can explain the observed association between pay-for-luck and bad corporate governance. The model also predicts that an improvement in the governance of badly governed firms has spillover effects that increase CEO pay in all firms. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Ceo pay Corporate governance Pay-for-luck Stock-options |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9182 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538017 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicolas Sahuguet,Pierre Chaigneau. DP9182 The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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