| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9187 |
| DP9187 Innovation, Competition, and Investment Timing | |
| Yrjö Koskinen | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-10-21 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and when to invest in it. Innovators have to provide costly effort and they learn privately the cost of investing. Multiple efforts have to be compensated for, but competition helps to erode innovators' informational rents, since innovators are more likely to lose the competition if they inflate investment costs. Consequently, competition leads to faster innovation, because the investor has less of a need to delay expensive investments. The investor's payoff sensitivity also increases with competition, thus enabling the investor to capture more of the upside of innovative activity. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Agency costs Auctions Innovation Investment timing Real options |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9187 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538022 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yrjö Koskinen. DP9187 Innovation, Competition, and Investment Timing. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Yrjö Koskinen]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Yrjö Koskinen]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Yrjö Koskinen]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
