| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9199 |
| DP9199 Centralized decision making against informed lobbying | |
| Thierry Verdier; Humberto Moreira | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-10-28 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We re-address the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized decision making of local policies when policymakers are subject to capture by special interest groups. In particular, we consider the case where lobbies have private information about their ability to exert influence. We find a new informational effect in the political game under centralized structures that gives the policymaker additional bargaining power against lobbies. Thus, when compared to decentralization, centralization reduces capture, and is more likely to be welfare enhancing in the presence of information asymmetries. Then, we apply the model to the classical problem of local public goods provision and to the incentives towards the creation of customs unions agreements. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Centralization Custom unions Lobbying Public goods |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9199 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538033 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Verdier,Humberto Moreira. DP9199 Centralized decision making against informed lobbying. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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