| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9207 |
| DP9207 Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing | |
| Marco Pagano; Marco Di Maggio | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-11-11 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a model where some investors (?hedgers?) are bad at information processing, while others (?speculators?) have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading, hedgers do the same, depressing the asset price. Market transparency reinforces this mechanism, by making speculators? trades more visible to hedgers. As a consequence, asset sellers will oppose both the disclosure of fundamentals and trading transparency. This is socially inefficient if a large fraction of market participants are speculators and hedgers have low processing costs. But in these circumstances, forbidding hedgers? access to the market may dominate mandatory disclosure. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Financial disclosure Market transparency Information processing Rational inattention Liquidity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9207 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538041 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Pagano,Marco Di Maggio. DP9207 Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing. 2012. |
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