| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9230 |
| DP9230 You Owe Me | |
| Klaus Schmidt; Ulrike M. Malmendier | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-11-25 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or in-formational effects, small gifts strongly influence the recipient?s behavior in favor of the gift giver, in particular when a third party bears the cost. Subjects are well aware that the gift is given to influence their behavior but reciprocate nevertheless. Withholding the gift triggers a strong negative response. These findings are incon-sistent with the most prominent models of social preferences. We propose an ex-tension of existing theories to capture the observed behavior by endogenizing the ?reference group? to whom social preferences are applied. We also show that dis-closure and size limits are not effective in reducing the effect of gifts, consistent with our model. Financial incentives ameliorate the effect of the gift but backfire when available but not provided. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Corruption Externalities Gift exchange Lobbyism Reciprocity Social preferences |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9230 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538064 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaus Schmidt,Ulrike M. Malmendier. DP9230 You Owe Me. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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