全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP9231 Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP9231
	DP9231 Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation
	Klaus Schmidt; Ernst Fehr; Björn Bartling
发表日期	2012-11-25
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse this flexibility to exploit the agent. We capture this tradeoff in an experimental design and show that principals exhibit a strong preference for the employment contract. However, selfish principals exploit agents in one-shot interactions, inducing them to resist entering into employment contracts. This resistance to employment contracts vanishes if fairness preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread, endogenous formation of efficient long-run employment relations. Our results inform the theory of the firm by showing how behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration ? the abuse of authority ? and by providing an empirical basis for assessing differences between the Marxian and the Coasian view of the firm, as well as Alchian and Demsetz?s (1972) critique of the Coasian approach.
主题	Labour Economics
关键词	Authority Employment relation Fairness Power abuse Reputation Theory of the firm Transaction cost economics
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp9231
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538065
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Klaus Schmidt,Ernst Fehr,Björn Bartling. DP9231 Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation. 2012.