| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9234 |
| DP9234 Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment | |
| Micael Castanheira; Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-11-25 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the majority is divided as a result of information imperfections. The minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. The majority thus faces two problems: aggregating information and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. Two types of equilibria coexist under plurality: either voters aggregate information, but this requires splitting their votes, or they coordinate but cannot aggregate information. With approval voting, expected welfare is strictly higher, because some voters multiple vote to achieve both goals at once. In the laboratory, we observe both types of equilibrium under plurality. Which one is selected depends on the size of the minority. Approval voting vastly outperforms plurality. Finally, subject behavior suggests the need to study asymmetric equilibria. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Approval voting Experiments Multicandidate elections Plurality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9234 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538068 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Micael Castanheira,Laurent Bouton,Aniol Llorente-Saguer. DP9234 Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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