| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9242 |
| DP9242 Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets | |
| Alessandra Casella | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-12-02 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium. In equilibrium, only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demand enough votes to alone control a majority. The probability of a minority victory is independent of the size of the minority and converges to one half, for any minority size, when the electorate is arbitrarily large. In a large electorate, the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant: democracy is undone by the market. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Majority voting Minority Vote buying Vote trading Voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9242 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538077 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella. DP9242 Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets. 2012. |
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