| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9263 |
| DP9263 Economic Science and Political Influence | |
| Gilles Saint-Paul | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-12-16 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statistical institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Autocoherent models Degenerative research programs Identification Ideology Intellectual competition Macroeconomic modelling Polarization Self-confirming equilibria |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9263 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538098 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gilles Saint-Paul. DP9263 Economic Science and Political Influence. 2012. |
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