| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9287 |
| DP9287 Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz; Eva Hoppe-Fischer | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-13 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the laboratory and to what extent deviations from standard theory can be explained by social preferences. Investigating settings with both exogenous and endogenous information structures, we find that agency theory is indeed useful to qualitatively predict how variations in the degree of uncertainty affect subjects' behavior. Regarding the quantitative deviations from standard predictions, our analysis based on several control treatments and quantal response estimations shows that agents' behavior can be explained by social preferences that are less pronounced than in conventional ultimatum games. Principals' own social preferences are not an important determinant of their behavior. However, when the principals make contract offers, they anticipate that social preferences affect agents' behavior. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Agency theory Experiment Information gathering Social preferences Ultimatum game |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9287 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538123 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz,Eva Hoppe-Fischer. DP9287 Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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