| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9290 |
| DP9290 Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis | |
| Massimo Motta; Natalia Fabra | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-13 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a model in which firms can go bankrupt because of adverse market shocks or antitrust fines, we find that even large corporate fines may not be able to induce deterrence. Managerial penalties are thus needed. If the policy may be changed according to the state of the business cycle, then the optimal outcome can always be achieved through antitrust fines that are more severe in good times and more lenient in bad times. A time-independent policy may result in either too many bankruptcies or under-deterrence as compared to the optimal policy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Antitrust fines Managing incentives Business cycles |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9290 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538126 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Motta,Natalia Fabra. DP9290 Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis. 2013. |
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