| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9294 |
| DP9294 The effect of options on coordination | |
| Bernardo Guimaraes; Luis Araujo | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-20 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies how constraints on the timing of actions affect equilibrium in intertemporal coordination problems. We show that while the possibility of waiting longer for others'? actions helps agents to coordinate in the good equilibrium, the option of delaying one?s' actions harms coordination and can induce severe coordination failures: if agents are very patient, they might get arbitrarily low expected payoffs even in cases where coordination would yield arbitrarily large returns. The risk-dominant equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot game is selected when the option to delay effort is commensurate with the option to wait longer for others?' actions. In an application to innovation processes, we show that protection of the domestic industry might hinder industrialization. We also argue that increased competition might have spurred the emergence of shadow banking in the last few decades. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Coordination failures Delay Option Strategic complementarities |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9294 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538130 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bernardo Guimaraes,Luis Araujo. DP9294 The effect of options on coordination. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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