| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9302 |
| DP9302 Hospital competition with soft budgets | |
| Kurt Richard Brekke; Luigi Siciliani | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-20 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effoort when their budgets are soft, i.e., the payer may cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. The basic set up is a Hotelling model with two hospitals that differ in location and face demand uncertainty, where the hospitals run deficits (surpluses) in the high (low) demand state. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. For given cost efficiency, softer budgets increase quality since parts of the expenditures may be covered by the payer. However, softer budgets reduce cost-reducing effort and the profit margin, which in turn weakens quality incentives. We also find that profit confiscation reduces quality and cost-reducing effort. First best is achieved by a strict no-bailout and no-profit-confiscation policy when the regulated price is optimally set. However, for suboptimal prices a more lenient bailout policy can be welfare improving. When we allow for heterogeneity in costs and qualities, we also show that a softer budget can raise quality for high-cost patients (and therefore reduce 'skimping' on such patients). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Cost efficiency Hospital competition Quality Soft budgets |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9302 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538138 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kurt Richard Brekke,Luigi Siciliani. DP9302 Hospital competition with soft budgets. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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