| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9311 |
| DP9311 Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises | |
| Elena Carletti; Agnese Leonello | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-27 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model where banks invest in reserves and loans, and face aggregate liquidity shocks. Banks with liquidity shortage sell loans on the interbank market. Two equilibria emerge. In the no default equilibrium, all banks hold enough reserves and remain solvent. In the mixed equilibrium, some banks default with positive probability. The former exists when credit market competition is intense. The latter emerges when banks exercise market power. Thus, competition is beneficial to financial stability. The structure of liquidity shocks affects the severity and the occurrence of crises, as well as the amount of credit available in the economy. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Default Interbank market Price volatility |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9311 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538147 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Elena Carletti,Agnese Leonello. DP9311 Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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