G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9311
DP9311 Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises
Elena Carletti; Agnese Leonello
发表日期2013-01-27
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要We develop a model where banks invest in reserves and loans, and face aggregate liquidity shocks. Banks with liquidity shortage sell loans on the interbank market. Two equilibria emerge. In the no default equilibrium, all banks hold enough reserves and remain solvent. In the mixed equilibrium, some banks default with positive probability. The former exists when credit market competition is intense. The latter emerges when banks exercise market power. Thus, competition is beneficial to financial stability. The structure of liquidity shocks affects the severity and the occurrence of crises, as well as the amount of credit available in the economy.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Default Interbank market Price volatility
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9311
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538147
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Elena Carletti,Agnese Leonello. DP9311 Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises. 2013.
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