| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9314 |
| DP9314 Unraveling Short- and Farsightedness in Politics | |
| Hans Gersbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-27 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents' last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible and a fixed pension scheme. In the flexible pension scheme, the pension increases with short-term performance, using the vote share of the officeholder's party in the next election as an indicator. Self-selection yields welfare optimality as officeholders are encouraged to invest in those activities that benefit society most. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Effort Elections Incumbents Political contracts Selection Vote share thresholds |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9314 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538150 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach. DP9314 Unraveling Short- and Farsightedness in Politics. 2013. |
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