| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9315 |
| DP9315 Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information | |
| Aner Sela; Ori Haimanko | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-27 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over his opponent. We characterize the unique equilibrium in these contests, and examine the role of information in determining the players' expected efforts, probabilities of winning, and expected payoffs. In particular, we show that the players always have the same probability of winning the contest, and that their expected efforts are the same, but their expected payoffs are different. It is also shown that budget constraints may have an unanticipated effect on the players' expected payoffs, i.e., a player's information advantage may turn into a payoff disadvantage. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | All-pay auctions Asymmetric information Information advantage |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9315 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538151 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aner Sela,Ori Haimanko. DP9315 Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information. 2013. |
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