| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9323 |
| DP9323 All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality | |
| Armin Schmutzler | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-27 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high expected highest efforts without generating excessive wasteful efforts of losers. All-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can do better than all-pay auctions with fixed prizes in this respect, in particular, when the prize function is approximately linear. We use the results to compare patents and prizes as innovation incentives, and to explore promotion incentives in organizations. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | All-pay auctions Contests Endogenous prizes Implementation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9323 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538159 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Armin Schmutzler. DP9323 All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Armin Schmutzler]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Armin Schmutzler]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Armin Schmutzler]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
