| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9336 |
| DP9336 Social Security, Unemployment Risk and Efficient Bargaining between Unions and Firms | |
| PIETRO REICHLIN | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-02-10 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We construct an overlapping generations model with unemployment risk where wages, employment and severance payments are set through efficient bargaining between risk averse Unions and risk neutral firms. Assuming that a First Best cannot be achieved due to workers' shirking incentives, we characterize a Second Best allocation and show how this can be implemented in a market economy. We prove that the latter generates too little employment and consumption smoothing, an excessive young age consumption and too much saving with respect to the Second Best. This inefficiency can be reduced by increasing the intensity of a pay-as-you-go social security system even if the economy is dynamically efficient. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Labor markets Risk Social security Unemployment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9336 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538172 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | PIETRO REICHLIN. DP9336 Social Security, Unemployment Risk and Efficient Bargaining between Unions and Firms. 2013. |
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