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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP9354 |
DP9354 Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions | |
Helder Vasconcelos; Ricardo Ribeiro | |
发表日期 | 2013-02-17 |
出版年 | 2013 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial acquisitions involving pure financial interests and/or effective corporate control on prices, market shares,firm profits and consumer welfare. The proposed methodology can deal with differentiated products industries, with both direct and indirect partial ownership interests and nests full mergers (100% financial and control acquisitions) as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Antitrust Demand estimation Differentiated products Oligopoly Partial acquisitions Unilateral effects |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9354 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538189 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helder Vasconcelos,Ricardo Ribeiro. DP9354 Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions. 2013. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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