G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9354
DP9354 Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions
Helder Vasconcelos; Ricardo Ribeiro
发表日期2013-02-17
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial acquisitions involving pure financial interests and/or effective corporate control on prices, market shares,firm profits and consumer welfare. The proposed methodology can deal with differentiated products industries, with both direct and indirect partial ownership interests and nests full mergers (100% financial and control acquisitions) as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Antitrust Demand estimation Differentiated products Oligopoly Partial acquisitions Unilateral effects
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9354
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538189
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Helder Vasconcelos,Ricardo Ribeiro. DP9354 Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions. 2013.
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