| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP9351
|
| DP9351 Rational parasites |
| roberto galbiati
|
| 发表日期 | 2013-02-24
|
| 出版年 | 2013
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Understanding the impact of legal protection on investment is of major importance. This paper provides a framework for addressing this issue, and shows that investment may actually be higher in the absence of legal protection. Focusing on the application to innovation, in an environment where an innovator (the host) repeatedly faces the same imitators (parasites), we show that investment can take place even without patent protection, as parasites limit their imitation to preserve the innovator's incentives to invest. We show further that an innovator might be more active without legal protection: it is forced to increase its investment to keep the parasites satisfied and, thus, cooperative. We provide experimental evidence consistent with the theoretical results: in the experiment, investment levels with and without legal protection are comparable, and sometimes greater without patents. Our framework is general enough to apply to other situations such as investment in developing countries, commons' management and long-distance trade. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Experiment
investment
Patent
Repeated games
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9351
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538193
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
roberto galbiati. DP9351 Rational parasites. 2013.
|
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