G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9361
DP9361 Fixed-Mobile Integration
Steffen Hoernig; Carlo Cambini
发表日期2013-02-24
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Call externality Integration Network competition On/off-net pricing
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9361
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538197
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Steffen Hoernig,Carlo Cambini. DP9361 Fixed-Mobile Integration. 2013.
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