| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9361 |
| DP9361 Fixed-Mobile Integration | |
| Steffen Hoernig; Carlo Cambini | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-02-24 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Call externality Integration Network competition On/off-net pricing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9361 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538197 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steffen Hoernig,Carlo Cambini. DP9361 Fixed-Mobile Integration. 2013. |
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