G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9376
DP9376 Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access
Steffen Hoernig; Carlo Cambini
发表日期2013-03-10
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要We investigate cooperative investment for the deployment of a new infrastructure, and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment increases total coverage only if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for co-investment not only through lower returns but also by the existence of the access option itself. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Access obligations Co-investment Networks Uncertainty
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9376
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538212
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Steffen Hoernig,Carlo Cambini. DP9376 Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access. 2013.
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