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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP9376 |
DP9376 Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access | |
Steffen Hoernig; Carlo Cambini | |
发表日期 | 2013-03-10 |
出版年 | 2013 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We investigate cooperative investment for the deployment of a new infrastructure, and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment increases total coverage only if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for co-investment not only through lower returns but also by the existence of the access option itself. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Access obligations Co-investment Networks Uncertainty |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9376 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538212 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steffen Hoernig,Carlo Cambini. DP9376 Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access. 2013. |
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