G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9384
DP9384 Deception detection and the role of self-selection
Kai Konrad; Salmai Qari
发表日期2013-03-10
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要We consider a lie-catching experiment with 9240 judgements. A set of videotapes shows subjects participating in a tax compliance experiment. The subjects chose whether or not to misreport. Subjects knew that underreporters were chosen for an audit with some probability. An audit led to detection and to a punishment fee. This compliance framework induced only persons with high deceptive abilities to underreport and, so, caused self-selection. Among the students who judged these videos, we find that the deception detection rate was significantly below 50 percent and even lower if the self-selection pressure in the tax compliance experiment was higher. This suggests that, when subjects can choose whether to state the truth or to lie, there is a self-selection effect by which individuals with higher deceptive ability are more likely to lie.
主题Public Economics
关键词Decision making Interpersonal interaction Judgment Perception
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9384
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538220
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kai Konrad,Salmai Qari. DP9384 Deception detection and the role of self-selection. 2013.
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