| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9385 |
| DP9385 Selling to a cartel of retailers: a model of hub-and-spoke collusion | |
| Nicolas Sahuguet; Alexis Walckiers | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-10 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This model describes the working of hub-and-spoke collusion that has been discussed recently by competition policy authorities. We develop a model of tacit collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers, competing a la Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). The best collusive equilibrium between retailers is inefficient and it is in the interest of the supplier to help retailers reach a more efficient collusive equilibrium. The hub and spoke conspiracy reduces double marginalization, but raises the ability of retailers to collude. The impact of a hub-and-spoke cartel on consumer's welfare depends on the bargaining power in the relationship. If the supplier has the bargaining power, the agreement, comparable to a vertical restraint, can be welfare improving in reducing double marginalization. When retailers have the bargaining power, the agreement is closer to an horizontal agreement in which retailers use the supplier to improve their collusive scheme, which leads to a loss of welfare. The result has important implications for competition policy and antitrust enforcement which are further developed in our companion paper Sahuguet and Walckiers (2013). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collusion Competition policy Horizontal relations Hub-and-spoke Vertical relations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9385 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538221 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicolas Sahuguet,Alexis Walckiers. DP9385 Selling to a cartel of retailers: a model of hub-and-spoke collusion. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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