| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9396 |
| DP9396 Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-17 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete contracts. We explore the implications of different degrees of relationship-specificity when there are two parties, A and B, who can make investments in physical capital (instead of human capital). If relationship-specificity is exogenously given, it turns out that joint asset ownership can be optimal only if the degree of relationship-specificity is sufficiently small. If relationship-specificity can be freely chosen and if party A's investments are more productive, then the parties deliberately choose a strictly positive level of relationship-specificity and they always agree on sole ownership by party A. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Investment incentives Ownership Relationship-specificity Theory of the firm |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9396 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538232 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP9396 Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach. 2013. |
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