| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9397 |
| DP9397 Screening-Based Competition | |
| Thomas Gehrig | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-03-17 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We apply a reduced form representation of product market competition, facilitating an explicit characterization of the equilibrium investments in consumer-specific screening. The effects of market structure on screening incentives depend on the microstructure of the imperfect screening technology and on the characteristics of the pool of consumers. We conduct a welfare analysis, which reveals that the microstructure of the screening technology and the characteristics of the pool of consumers determine whether there are private incentives for overinvestment or underinvestment in screening. Furthermore, we show that the introduction of screening competition amplifies market failures associated with screening investments. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Imperfect competition Imperfect screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9397 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538233 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Gehrig. DP9397 Screening-Based Competition. 2013. |
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