| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9452 |
| DP9452 Measuring Political Information Rents: Evidence from the European Agricultural Reform | |
| Hans Peter Grüner | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a method to estimate information rents of losers of a reform who receive a monetary compensation. Our method explicitly accounts for survey respondents' reluctance to reveal a willingness to accept which is smaller than the actual compensation. We apply our approach to the case of the 2005 European agricultural reform using uniquely gathered survey data from farmers in Lower Saxony, Germany. We find empirical indications for strategic misreporting. Correcting for these effects with a structural model, we find that information rents are in the order of up to 15 per cent of total compensation paid. Moreover, we show that the reform could not have been implemented distinctly cheaper by conditioning compensation schemes on observable factors. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Information rents European agricultural reform |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9452 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538287 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Peter Grüner. DP9452 Measuring Political Information Rents: Evidence from the European Agricultural Reform. 2013. |
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