G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9458
DP9458 Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts
Mark Schankerman; Alberto Galasso
发表日期2013-04-28
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要Cumulative innovation is central to economic growth. Do patent rights facilitate or impede such follow-on innovation? This paper studies the effect of removing patent protection through court invalidation on the subsequent research related to the focal patent, as measured by later citations. We exploit random allocation of judges at the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit to control for the endogeneity of patent invalidation. We find that patent invalidation leads to a 50 percent increase in subsequent citations to the focal patent, on average, but the impact is highly heterogeneous. Patent rights appear to block follow-on innovation only in the technology fields of computers, electronics and medical instruments. Moreover, the effect is entirely driven by invalidation of patents owned by large patentees that triggers entry of small innovators, suggesting that patents may impede the ?democratization? of innovation.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Cumulative innovation Patents Litigation Judges Courts
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9458
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538292
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Mark Schankerman,Alberto Galasso. DP9458 Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts. 2013.
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