| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP9460
|
| DP9460 Relational Knowledge Transfers |
| Luis Garicano; Luis Rayo
|
| 发表日期 | 2013-05-05
|
| 出版年 | 2013
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | An expert must train a novice. The novice initially has no cash, so he can only pay the expert with the accumulated surplus from his production. At any time, the novice can leave the relationship with his acquired knowledge and produce on his own. The sole reason he does not is the prospect of learning in future periods. The profit-maximizing relationship is structured as an apprenticeship, in which all production generated during training is used to compensate the expert. Knowledge transfer takes a simple form. In the first period, the expert gifts the novice a positive level of knowledge, which is independent of the players' discount rate. After that, the novice's total value of knowledge grows at the players' discount rate until all knowledge has been transferred. The inefficiencies that arise from this contract are caused by the expert's artificially slowing down the rate of knowledge transfer rather than by her reducing the total amount of knowledge eventually transferred. We show that these inefficiencies are larger the more patient the players are. Finally, we study the impact of knowledge externalities across players. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | General human capital
Knowledge
Relational contracts
Skills
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9460
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538295
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Luis Garicano,Luis Rayo. DP9460 Relational Knowledge Transfers. 2013.
|
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