| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP9467
|
| DP9467 Benchmarking Politicians |
| Antonio Estache
|
| 发表日期 | 2013-05-05
|
| 出版年 | 2013
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study a political system in which voters can optimally pick between political platforms, but cannot screen the quality of individual politicians associated with these platforms. A bad individual achievement can correspond to either incompetence (adverse selection) or corruption (moral hazard). Information could improve, if independent experts assess achievements as compared to commitments, allowing independent judges to investigate possible corruption. We find that while good experts are always beneficial as they increase transparency, the impact of the quality of judges is ambiguous. Above a threshold, with risk-averse social planners, good judges increase the incentive-compatible punishment of politicians, at the cost of possible judiciary mistakes. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9467
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538302
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Antonio Estache. DP9467 Benchmarking Politicians. 2013.
|
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