| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9475 |
| DP9475 A Reverse Holdup Problem: When workers? lack of bargaining power slows economic adjustments | |
| Antonio Estache | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-05-12 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a model of horizontal matching on the labor market, we show that increasing workers? bargaining power may increase some employers? incentive to switch to new production activities. In particular, this could lead to (i) higher wages, (ii) more jobs, (iii) better jobs and (iv) higher profits. Paradoxically, the median voter may object to the economic adjustments because search costs could cut the surplus for a majority of workers, even when it creates jobs for the other ones and increases aggregate surplus. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9475 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538310 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antonio Estache. DP9475 A Reverse Holdup Problem: When workers? lack of bargaining power slows economic adjustments. 2013. |
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