G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9477
DP9477 Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?
Maitreesh Ghatak
发表日期2013-05-12
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. Relative to flat pay, incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent.
主题Development Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Public services Information constraints Incentive pay Social proximity Knowledge transmission
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9477
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538312
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Maitreesh Ghatak. DP9477 Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?. 2013.
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