| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9492 |
| DP9492 Why do governments default, and why don't they default more often? | |
| Willem Buiter; Ebrahim Rahbari | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-05-26 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers the economic and political drivers of sovereign default, focusing on countries rich enough to render sovereign default a ?won?t pay? rather than a ?can?t pay? phenomenon. Unlike many private contracts, sovereign debt contracts rely almost exclusively on self-enforcement rather than on third-party enforcement. Among the social costs of sovereign default are contagion and concentration risk, both within and outside the jurisdiction of the sovereign, and ?rule of law externalities?. We consider illiquidity as a separate trigger for sovereign default and emphasize the role of lenders of last resort for the sovereign. Not only do political economy factors drive sovereign insolvency, they also influence the debt sustainability analyses performed by national and international agencies. We consider it likely that the absence of sovereign defaults in the advanced economies since the (West) German defaults of 1948 and 1953 until the Greek defaults of 2012 was a historical aberration that is unlikely to be a reliable guide to the future. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal sustainability Intertemporal budget constraint Political economy. Solvency Sovereign default Strategic default |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9492 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538328 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Willem Buiter,Ebrahim Rahbari. DP9492 Why do governments default, and why don't they default more often?. 2013. |
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