| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9501 |
| DP9501 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Anonymous Markets | |
| Konrad O Stahl; Tobias Klein; Christian Lambertz | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-09 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effects of improvements in eBay's rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did not lead to increased exit of poorly rated sellers. Yet, buyer valuation of the staying sellers ? especially the poorly rated ones ? improved significantly. By our preferred interpretation, the latter effect results from increased seller effort; also, when sellers have the choice between exiting (a reduction in adverse selection) and improved behavior (a reduction in moral hazard), then they prefer the latter because of lower cost. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Anonymous markets Adverse selection Moral hazard Reputation building mechanisms |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9501 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538337 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konrad O Stahl,Tobias Klein,Christian Lambertz. DP9501 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Anonymous Markets. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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