| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9508 |
| DP9508 Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance | |
| Alan Morrison; Lucy White | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-16 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank?s failure may undermine confidence in the banking regulator?s competence, and, hence, in other banks chartered by the same regulator. As a result, depositors withdraw funds from otherwise unconnected banks. The optimal regulatory response to this behaviour can be privately to exhibit forbearance to a failing bank. We show that regulatory transparency improves confidence ex ante but impedes regulators? ability to stem panics ex post. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank regulation Contagion Reputation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9508 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538344 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alan Morrison,Lucy White. DP9508 Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance. 2013. |
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