| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9510 |
| DP9510 Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz; Eva Hoppe-Fischer | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-16 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total surplus is not different from the symmetric information benchmark, while in the bad state, private information may be welfare-reducing. We have conducted a laboratory experiment with 954 participants to test these hypotheses. While the results largely corroborate the theoretical predictions, we also find that private information may be welfare-enhancing in the good state. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incentive theory Laboratory experiment Mechanism design Private information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9510 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538346 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz,Eva Hoppe-Fischer. DP9510 Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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