| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9511 |
| DP9511 Aggregate Oligopoly Games with Entry | |
| Simon Anderson | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-16 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use cumulative reaction functions to compare long-run market structures in aggregative oligopoly games. We first compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games. We show strong neutrality properties across market structures. The aggregator stays the same, despite changes in the number of firms and their actions. The IIA property of demands (CES and logit) implies that consumer surplus depends on the aggregator alone, and that the Bertrand pricing game is aggregative. We link together the following results: merging parties' profits fall but consumer surplus is unchanged, Stackelberg leadership raises welfare, monopolistic competition is the market structure with the highest surplus. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Aggregative games Oligopoly theory Entry Strategic substitutes and complements Iia property Mergers Leadership Contests Monopolistic competition Logit/ces |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9511 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538347 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simon Anderson. DP9511 Aggregate Oligopoly Games with Entry. 2013. |
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