| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9520 |
| DP9520 How Do Politicians Save? Buffer Stock Management of Unemployment Insurance Finance | |
| Bent E Sørensen; Steven G. Craig | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper successfully fits a model of forward looking government savings behavior to data from the U.S. state Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs 1976-2008. Specifically, we find states do not perfectly smooth tax rates in Barro's sense, but follow behavior consistent with a buffer stock model where politicians trade-off their desire to immediately expend all savings against the fear of running out of funds. We find that states increase benefits or lower taxes when savings balances are high. State UI budgets, as rationalized by the buffer stock model, display surpluses that are more pro-cyclical than Barro's model would imply but substantially less cyclical than contemporaneous budget balance. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Forward looking politicians Impatience Precautionary saving |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9520 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538356 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bent E Sørensen,Steven G. Craig. DP9520 How Do Politicians Save? Buffer Stock Management of Unemployment Insurance Finance. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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