G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP9520
DP9520 How Do Politicians Save? Buffer Stock Management of Unemployment Insurance Finance
Bent E Sørensen; Steven G. Craig
发表日期2013-06-23
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要This paper successfully fits a model of forward looking government savings behavior to data from the U.S. state Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs 1976-2008. Specifically, we find states do not perfectly smooth tax rates in Barro's sense, but follow behavior consistent with a buffer stock model where politicians trade-off their desire to immediately expend all savings against the fear of running out of funds. We find that states increase benefits or lower taxes when savings balances are high. State UI budgets, as rationalized by the buffer stock model, display surpluses that are more pro-cyclical than Barro's model would imply but substantially less cyclical than contemporaneous budget balance.
主题International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词Forward looking politicians Impatience Precautionary saving
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp9520
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538356
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Bent E Sørensen,Steven G. Craig. DP9520 How Do Politicians Save? Buffer Stock Management of Unemployment Insurance Finance. 2013.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Bent E Sørensen]的文章
[Steven G. Craig]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Bent E Sørensen]的文章
[Steven G. Craig]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Bent E Sørensen]的文章
[Steven G. Craig]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。