全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP9523 Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance in Political Selection in China

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP9523
	DP9523 Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance in Political Selection in China
	Masayuki Kudamatsu; Ruixue Jia; David Seim
发表日期	2013-06-23
出版年	2013
语种	英语
摘要	Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leaders, a pool of candidates for top political office, and examine how their chance of being promoted depends on performance - measured by provincial economic growth - and connections with top politicians - measured by past joint work in the same branch of government. A simple theoretical framework suggests that performance and connections may interact, an aspect ignored in the previous literature. Over the period 1993-2009, we find a positive correlation between promotion and growth that is robustly stronger for connected provincial leaders than for unconnected ones. This evidence indicates that performance and connections are complements in the Chinese political selection process. Auxiliary evidence suggests that the documented promotion pattern does not distort the allocation of talent.
主题	Development Economics
关键词	Chinese provincial leaders Political selection in autocracy Promotion Social Networks
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp9523
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538359
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Masayuki Kudamatsu,Ruixue Jia,David Seim. DP9523 Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance in Political Selection in China. 2013.