| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9526 |
| DP9526 Dynamic Countervailing Power under Public and Private Monitoring | |
| Venkataraman Bhaskar | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine buyer strategic power in the model of dynamic Bertrand-Edgeworth competition. Two sellers with a limited inventory sell to a single buyer, who has a consumption opportunity in each period. The market power of the sellers is offset by the strategic power of the buyer. By not consuming in any period, the buyer can destroy a unit of demand, thereby intensifying future price competition. If transactions are publicly observed, we find that that a strategic buyer can do significantly better than non-strategic buyers; strategic power may also give rise to inefficiencies. However, if an agent only perfectly observes those transactions in which he is directly involved, and imperfectly observes other transactions, the strategic power of the buyer is reduced, and in some cases, may be completely eliminated. This highlights the sharp discontinuity between the equilibrium outcomes between perfect and imperfect monitoring. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Dynamic games Imperfect monitoring Strategic buyer Bertrand-edgeworth competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9526 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/538362 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Venkataraman Bhaskar. DP9526 Dynamic Countervailing Power under Public and Private Monitoring. 2013. |
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